In addition to (1) and (2), Jeffrey offers the following extra-systematic constraint:
Informally, (3) expresses certainty in the disjunction: either H entails E or H refutes E. Given the background assumption that Pr(E) = 1, it is straightforward
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Earman shows that -given the background assumption that Pr(E) = 1 - (1), (2) and (4) Having said that, we would prefer a more general approach, which (a) doesn't presuppose that Pr(E) = 1; and, (b) doesn't require interpreting X and Y in terms of entailment relations. In the next section, we describe just such an approach.
A New Garber-Style Approach
We like Garber's idea of adding a pair of extra-systematic statements (and extrasystematic credal constraints) to the H, E-language. But, we think the existing implementation of this general strategy has two main shortcomings. First, we think interpreting "X" and "Y " as "H entails E" and "H refutes E" is unduly restrictive. It is more plausible to suppose that what is learned in cases of old evidence (viz., X) may not (always) be a logical fact. To be more precise, let "X" and "Y " be interpreted as follows:
• We are not the first to consider this sort of generalization of Garber's approach. Garber himself (1983, 112) considers some alternative interpretations of X and Y , which have a more general explanatory flavor. However, all of the alternatives Garber mentions involve some pattern of entailment relations between the salient propositions. So, Garber's account(s) would still be restricted to forms of explanation that supervene on deductive entailment relations. Moreover, Garber never works out any of these alternatives in any detail. Hartmann (2014) uses general explanatory language to interpret X and Y . Our approach is intended as a simplification of Hartmann's original idea (which is more complex, theoretically). A new paper by Jan Sprenger (Sprenger 2015 ) also appeals to explanatory relations, but in a different way.
3
When we say H is H's "best competitor," we mean that H is H's best competitor with respect to explaining/predicting phenomenon E -e.g., in our Mercury example, H was general relativity, H was Newtonian theory, and E was the evidence (available in 1915) regarding the perihelion of Mercury.
A NEW GARBER-STYLE SOLUTION TO THE PROBLEM OF OLD EVIDENCE 3
A second problem with the traditional Garber-style approaches is that they have required extra-systematic credal constraints [e.g., Pr(E) = 1, (2), and (3)] which are implausibly strong. This defect is also remedied by moving to our alternative, explanatory extra-systematic interpretation of X and Y . Consider the following four ordinal constraints on Pr(· | ·).
Let's examine each of four constraints, in turn. Suppose that H adequately explains E, but its best competitor H does not. Constraints (5.1) and (5.2) assert that H is more probable, given this supposition (X & ¬Y ) than it is given either the supposition that neither H nor H adequately explains E (i.e., given ¬X & ¬Y ) or the supposition that H's best competitor (H ) adequately explains E, but H does not (¬X & Y ). These two constraints seem uncontroversial.
Constraint (5.3) also seems quite plausible. It asserts that H is less probable, given the supposition that its best competitor (H ) adequately explains E, but H does not (¬X & Y ) than it is given the supposition that both H and its best competitor (H ) adequately explain E (i.e., given X & Y ).
The fourth and final credal comparison (5.4) says that H is at least as probable, given the supposition that both H and its best competitor (H ) adequately explain E (i.e., given X & Y ) as it is given the supposition that neither H nor H adequately explains E (i.e., given ¬X & ¬Y ). One might maintain that it would be reasonable to rank Pr(H | X & Y ) strictly higher in one's comparative confidence ranking than Pr(H | ¬X & ¬Y ). After all, X & Y implies that H does adequately explain E (which is already known), whereas ¬X & ¬Y implies that H does not adequately explain E. On the other hand, one might also reasonably argue that these two suppositions (X & Y and ¬X & ¬Y ) place H and H on a par with respect to explaining E, and so they shouldn't confer different probabilities on H. Both of these positions are compatible with (5.4). The only thing (5.4) rules out is the claim that H is more probable given ¬X &¬Y than it is given X &Y . So, (5.4) is also eminently reasonable.
As it happens, the desired (Garberian) confirmation-theoretic conclusion ( †) follows from (5.1)-(5.4) alone. To be more precise, we can prove the following result. 
Suppose that x > 0 and y < 1. Then, (5.1)-(5.4) jointly entail
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And, by the law of total probability, we have:
Thus, (5.1)-(5.4) jointly entail Pr(H | X) > Pr(H | ¬X), and Pr(H | X) > Pr(H).
We think our Theorem undergirds a superior Garber-style approach to the problem of old-evidence. Specifically, our approach has the following two distinct advantages over traditional Garber-style approaches.
(i) Unlike previous Garber-style approaches, ours does not require the assumption that Pr(E) = 1. It may be true that our constraints (5.1)-(5.4) are most plausible given the background assumption that E is (antecedently) known with certainty. But, we think (5.1)-(5.4) retain enough of their plausibility, given only the weaker assumption that E is (antecedently) known with high credence.
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(ii) Our approach is not restricted to cases in which H (and/or H ) explains E in a deductive-nomological way. That is, our approach covers all cases in which scientists come to learn that their theory adequately explains E, not only those cases in which scientists learn that their theory entails E (or explains E deductive-nomologically). 
